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Children’s Health in a Legal Framework

Children’s Health in a Legal Framework
Clare Huntington and Elizabeth Scott
Summary
The U.S. legal system gives parents the authority and responsibility to make decisions about
their children’s health care, and favors parental rights over society’s collective responsibility to
provide for children’s welfare. Neither the federal government nor state governments have an
affirmative obligation to protect and promote children’s health, nor do children have a right to
such protection. In this sense, write Clare Huntington and Elizabeth Scott, policies to promote
child health in this country, such as those discussed elsewhere in this issue, are optional.
Our libertarian legal framework grants parents broad authority to raise their children as they
see fit. Parents can refuse recommended medical treatment for their children, and when
they do so, courts respond with deference, particularly when parents’ objections are based on
religious beliefs. Parental authority has its limits, however. For example, the government can
intervene to protect children’s welfare in cases of medical neglect or when the child’s life is
in danger. Additionally, the law sometimes limits parental authority over older children. For
example, teenagers may be able to refuse some treatments, such as psychiatric hospitalization,
over their parents’ objections. Older minors may also have access to treatments such as family
planning services without their parents’ consent.
Because the government has no positive obligation to promote children’s health, write
Huntington and Scott, children’s health programs are often underfunded and vulnerable to
political pressure. Programs are also more likely to focus on responding to family crises than
on helping parents raise healthy children. In this environment, policy makers, researchers, and
advocates must build political support by showing that investments in children’s health not
only benefit children but also promote social welfare.

www.futureofchildren.org
Clare Huntington is a professor at the Fordham University School of Law. Elizabeth Scott is a professor at Columbia Law School.
Mark Courtney of the University of Chicago reviewed and critiqued a draft of this article.
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I

n the United States, parents have
primary responsibility for their
children’s health and have a corresponding right to make health-care
decisions for their children. This
parental power, however, is not absolute.
Under its police power, the state can sometimes override parental rights to promote
social welfare: thus, for example, the state
can require that children be vaccinated
against disease.1 The state can also protect the welfare of individual children, if,
for example, their parents act in ways that
threaten their health. Parental rights are
qualified in another way as well. Lawmakers
have authorized adolescents to make some
health-care decisions without involving their
parents. Pregnant minors have a limited right
to obtain abortions and, in many states, birth
control treatment is available to teenagers.2 Finally, although not a legal exception,
in practice the government tends to defer
less to the parental rights of low-income
parents and to condition public assistance
on considerable intrusion into the family.
The legal system deals very differently with
most families, whose parental rights are
strongly protected, and low-income families, whose parental rights may receive little
consideration.
In this legal regime based on parental rights,
the state has the power to limit parental
authority, but it has no affirmative obligation to help parents care for their children’s
health needs unless it undertakes to do so,
as with Medicaid and the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP). Moreover, the
government’s deference to parents may deter
the state from providing useful services and
support.
An important implication of the United
States’ approach to children’s health and
1 78
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wellbeing is that efforts to improve children’s
health must be undertaken within the reality
of this libertarian framework. The U.S. legal
framework is germane to the other articles
in this issue because it demonstrates that
any policy proposal should be understood as
optional from the state’s perspective. It also
underscores the need to develop political
support for any initiative to improve health
services for children. Often, as this article
shows, the state intervenes to promote
children’s health only in response to compelling social welfare needs such as reducing teenage pregnancy, juvenile crime, and
communicable diseases, or to crises in which
parents abuse their children or fail to provide
adequate care.
In this article, we flesh out the legal framework that shapes and constrains children’s
health policy under American law. We focus
first on parental rights doctrine under constitutional and statutory law, its justification,
and the limits of parental rights. We examine an important conflict between parental
rights and the state’s interest in children’s
health involving cases where parents’ religious beliefs deter them from seeking medical treatment for their children. We then
explore the policy implications of the libertarian framework, explaining that because no
support for families is legally mandated, the
libertarian framework encourages a reactive
approach to child wellbeing based on crisis
intervention rather than prevention. Finally,
we examine adolescent health policy, an area
where the law has sometimes departed from
the parental rights approach, first by giving
adolescents authority to make some treatment decisions and, second, by intervening
through juvenile justice policies that mandate rehabilitation programs for delinquent
youth and their families.

Children’s Health in a Legal Framework

Legal Framework: Parental Rights
and State Authority
The U.S. legal system is based on strong
principles of individual liberty and autonomy
and relatively weak commitment to collective
responsibility for the welfare of individual
members of society. This libertarian strain in
our political and legal history is embodied in
constitutional parental rights doctrine elaborated by the Supreme Court in the twentieth
century. But the court has also recognized
that parents’ authority has limits when the
health and welfare of their children are at
stake and, in a series of important opinions,
it has sought to strike a balance between
parental rights and the state’s authority to
intervene to protect children.
Beginning with two landmark opinions in
the 1920s, the court has held that parents
have a liberty interest, protected under the
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
to raise their children as they see fit, free
from undue interference from the state.
The early Supreme Court opinions, Meyer
v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
both dealt with state statutes seeking to limit
parents’ freedom to guide their children’s
education, by requiring that instruction be
in English and that children attend public school, respectively.3 In each case, the
Supreme Court struck down the statute as
unreasonable interference with the parents’
liberty to direct their children’s education
and upbringing, a role that parents have
“the right, together with the high duty” to
perform.4 The court has been particularly
deferential when the claim of parental rights
is combined with a First Amendment claim
that a state law interferes with the parents’
right to teach their religious faith to their
children. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for example,
the court held that Amish parents could not

be found in violation of the state’s compulsory school attendance law for withdrawing
their children from public school after the
eighth grade to train them for their religious
roles in the Amish community.5
The Supreme Court has also made clear that
parental rights are not absolute.6 A statute
that limits parental authority may be justified
because it promotes child welfare (or social
welfare in general) under the government’s
police power. This was the justification for
Progressive Era laws in the early twentieth
century requiring school attendance and
prohibiting child labor. The state also has the
authority to protect the welfare of individual
children and other vulnerable members of
society who are unable to look out for their
own interests. This authority is the basis for
policies that allow the state to intervene in
families in child maltreatment cases.
The upshot is that parents have broad constitutional authority to guide their children’s
upbringing, subject to some constraints
embodied in the state’s legitimate interest
in protecting children. But the state has no
obligation to protect children or promote
their welfare, nor do children have a right
to state protection. Indeed, in a famous case
that arose in the 1980s, the Supreme Court
held that the state had no liability when an
abusive father grievously injured and disabled his child, even when the Department
of Social Services had been notified several
times of the father’s abuse and failed to intervene.7 Unless the state has actually taken
a child into custody or otherwise assumed
responsibility for her, the government has no
duty to provide for her welfare.
Furthermore, the United States has not
undertaken any obligation to promote
children’s health and wellbeing under
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international law. The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), for example, states that “the family, as the fundamental group of society and
the natural environment for the growth and
wellbeing of all its members and particularly
children, should be afforded the necessary
protection and assistance so that it can fully
assume its responsibilities within the community.”8 Signatory countries have several
obligations, including a duty to ensure that
children have health care, adequate food,
and education.9 Additionally, countries must
address “all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent
treatment, maltreatment, or exploitation,
including sexual abuse.”10 Every member
of the United Nations has ratified the CRC
except the United States and Somalia. The
United States’ stance appears to express
the libertarian values that shape its policy
toward children generally.

Justifications for Parental
Authority
The constitutional framework in which
parental rights play such a prominent
role has shaped legal regulation of the
parent-child relationship in many domains,
including health care. But deference to
parental authority under American law
is entrenched, in part, because it is supported by pragmatic justifications as well as
by libertarian principles. The law assumes
that most parents love their children, are
motivated to make decisions that promote
their welfare, and are best positioned to
know their needs. In this view, a parentalrights approach ultimately promotes children’s interests more effectively than any
alternative. Parents’ legal authority comes
in exchange for the responsibility that they
bear in caring for their children and guiding
1 80
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their upbringing.11 Giving parents responsibility also reduces the direct financial
burden on and cost to society.
In health care, parents’ authority includes
the right to consent to medical treatment
for their children, and also the right to
reject recommended treatment, discussed
below. Medical decisions require informed
consent by the patient—the ability to
understand treatment information, compare the risks and benefits of treatment
options, and make a decision.12 Children
are assumed to be incompetent to make
their own treatment decisions because of
their immaturity, and thus, under the law,
a competent adult must provide consent.
Because parents are presumed competent
and know their children better than other
adults do, the law views them as best situated to perform this function. Moreover,
parents are financially responsible for their
children’s health care. Parental control over
health-care decisions is challenged only
when parents are deficient or negligent in
carrying out this role, or when they reveal a
conflict of interest with their children.

The assumption that
children can’t make their
own treatment decisions
is probably accurate for
younger children, but likely
not for teenagers.
The assumption that children can’t make
their own treatment decisions is probably
accurate for younger children, but likely not
for teenagers. Indeed, research has found

Children’s Health in a Legal Framework

that by age 14, adolescents’ cognitive ability to understand and reason is sufficiently
developed that most teenagers are capable of
making informed medical decisions.13 But in
a legal framework based on parental rights,
children have little autonomy, and even
adolescents have limited authority to make
health-care decisions. As we discuss below,
the law has carved out some exceptions to
this general principle, where constitutional
interests or public health concerns are
implicated. For routine health-care decisions, however, all minors are subject to their
parents’ legal authority, and parents must
generally consent to treatment.

child, or, if the state determines that the
parents will not provide necessary medical treatment, the child might be placed in
foster care.15

Parents’ Failure to Provide
Medical Treatment

State deference is particularly strong when
parents refuse to provide treatment for their
children on religious grounds. These cases
have been treated as a special category,
distinct from other medical neglect cases.
Some religious sects oppose medical treatment, and members may either decline to
obtain treatment for their children or refuse
treatment urged by physicians. For example,
Christian Scientists believe that physical ailments should be treated by Christian Science
practitioners rather than medical doctors.17
These parents assert that they can refuse
medical treatment for their children on the
basis of their parental rights and their First
Amendment right to raise their children in
their religious faith.

Parental control includes the right to
decline as well as consent to medical treatment for their children. This authority is far
from absolute, however, and legal regulation constrains parents’ authority to refuse
or fail to obtain treatment deemed important for their children’s health. In general,
when parents fail in this regard, the child
welfare system may intervene on the basis
of child maltreatment. State statutes that
define parental abuse or neglect usually
include a provision that in cases of “willful
or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate …
medical treatment,” the state may order the
parents to obtain treatment or even remove
the child to state custody.14 As with other
forms of maltreatment, low-income families
are more likely than others to be subject
to intervention on the basis of medical
neglect, which may be one component of
a determination that a parent has generally failed to provide for the child’s needs.
In these cases, the family might be offered
help in obtaining medical treatment for the

In striking contrast, the general legal
response to parents who refuse to consent
to beneficial treatment for their children
is quite deferential. For example, the state
can require parents to have their children
vaccinated against communicable diseases,
but many states are reluctant to challenge
parents who refuse to do so.16 This has sometimes led to outbreaks of measles and other
preventable diseases.

In contrast to their response to medical
neglect cases, legislatures and courts have
largely respected these parents’ claims.
For example, in response to lobbying by
Christian Scientists and other groups,
many states have enacted civil and criminal
religious accommodation statutes. These
laws define child neglect to exclude parents’
good-faith decisions to treat their children
solely by spiritual means, according to the
VOL. 25 / NO. 1 / S PR ING 2015
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tenets of an organized religion.18 Thus, such
parents face neither liability nor the stigma
and intrusion associated with a finding of
child abuse or neglect. These statutes do
not preclude the state from intervening to
direct that a child receive medical treatment
if nontreatment poses a serious threat to her
life or health. But such intervention occurs
only if the child’s condition is dire and
becomes known to authorities. Most courts
have found that parents who seek spiritual
treatment bear no liability if their children
die because the children did not receive
medical assistance.19
A great deal of litigation has revolved around
states’ efforts to override parental authority
when parents refuse to allow their children
to receive necessary medical treatment for
religious reasons. In general, the judicial
response has been to order treatment when
the parents’ refusal seriously threatens the
child’s life or is likely to have severe and
lasting health consequences, and when the
proposed treatment is likely to have beneficial effects.20 Sometimes, courts have been
criticized for intervening too aggressively: In
a famous case involving a 15-year-old with
disfiguring neurofibromatosis, the court
ordered dangerous surgery requiring blood
transfusions over the religious objections of
both the mother and the child, even though
the surgery would have been safer if postponed until the boy was an adult.21 But, in
general, courts have been very deferential to
parents’ religious objections to conventional
medical treatment, occasionally even when
treatment represented the only hope for a
child’s survival. A Delaware court upheld the
right of Christian Scientist parents to refuse
painful chemotherapy that offered their
young child, who suffered from Birkhett’s
Lymphoma, a 40 percent chance of survival,
even though he faced certain death without
1 82
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the treatment.22 Several legal scholars have
sharply criticized this respectful approach,
but parental rights continue to be robust in
this context.23

How the Framework Affects
Policy Choices
The libertarian framework, which favors
parental rights over collective responsibility,
influences policy making in two significant
ways. First, without an affirmative legal
obligation to promote children’s health, governmental investment is optional. Although
many children’s health programs exist, they
are often underfunded and are vulnerable to
budgetary and political pressures. Moreover,
in our federalist system, broad discretion
translates into considerable variability among
states in children’s health programs. Second,
the libertarian framework encourages a
reactive rather than preventive approach to
children’s health and wellbeing. Deference
to parental authority has produced a system that primarily responds to family crises
rather than helping parents generally to raise
healthy children.
As Maya Rossin-Slater and Lawrence Berger
and Sarah Font write elsewhere in this issue,
when it comes to funding, the government
has chosen to promote children’s health and
family functioning through income supplements such as the Earned Income Tax
Credit, food voucher programs such as the
Special Supplemental Program for Women,
Infants, and Children, parenting support
initiatives such as the Triple P—Positive
Parenting Program and visiting nurse
programs, and child development efforts
such as Head Start. These authors show that
many such programs effectively promote
children’s health and wellbeing as well as
society’s interests.
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The authors show that many of these programs
are also highly cost-effective. The programs
that Rossin-Slater categorizes as intensive
center-based early childhood care, for example, improve both cognitive and noncognitive
outcomes for children and have a benefit-cost
ratio larger than one. And for every $1.00
invested in visiting nurse programs, which cost
$7,300 per child, society saves $5.70 in the
long run for high-risk populations and $1.26
for lower-risk populations.24

Indirect investments in
children’s health and family
wellbeing differ from state
to state.
Despite the social and economic benefits
of broad-based preventive programs, the
absence of any affirmative legal obligation to
promote children’s health means that these
programs are vulnerable to shifting budgetary and political priorities. Moreover, the
government often declines to respond to
pressing family needs, for example, by failing
to ensure paid parental leave or to provide
adequate subsidies for quality child care. As
Rossin-Slater writes in this issue, the United
States is one of the only countries that does
not guarantee new mothers some form of
paid leave.25 The federal Family and Medical
Leave Act requires employers to allow workers to take up to 12 weeks to care for a new
child or an ailing family member, but not all
employers and employees are covered. More
important, the leave is unpaid, which does
not help parents who must work to support
the family.26 Similarly, government subsidies
for child care do not come close to satisfying
the demand.

Additionally, the combination of optional
government funding and the federalist system of government in the United
States means that efforts to promote children’s health vary greatly among the states.
Eligibility for CHIP, for example, differs
from one state to the next. For example,
Alabama and Oklahoma have a similar
percentage of low-income children. But
Alabama caps CHIP eligibility for young
children at 300 percent of the federal poverty level and Oklahoma caps eligibility at
185 percent of the federal poverty level.27
Indirect investments in children’s health
and family wellbeing also differ from state
to state. As Berger and Font explain in this
issue, the federal Earned Income Tax Credit
is one of the most important antipoverty programs, and it is associated with better health
among children. Twenty-five states, the
District of Columbia, and two localities have
chosen to supplement the federal program
by offering a similar tax credit, providing
additional support for family incomes.28 But
this means that 25 states don’t offer a state
tax credit to low-income families. Moreover,
the existing state programs vary in generosity. Maryland’s Earned Income Tax Credit,
for example, provides up to 50 percent of
the federal credit and is fully refundable;
thus, families receive a payment from the
state government for the amount of the
credit rather than simply an offset against
taxes owed (a nonrefundable tax credit).29 By
contrast, Ohio’s Earned Income Tax Credit
is only 5 percent of the federal credit and is
nonrefundable.30
The federalist system certainly has advantages. It allows states to experiment with
different approaches to child health and
wellbeing, and states can thus learn from
one another. But the federalist system also
VOL. 25 / NO. 1 / S PR ING 2015
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allows states to offer greatly varying levels
of support for families, and services depend
on a state’s political values and financial
resources, underscoring the point that
government investment in children’s health
is optional.
The second major policy implication of the
libertarian framework is that it encourages
the government to take a reactive, rather
than preventive, approach to children’s
health and wellbeing. Because of the importance of family autonomy, the government
seldom intervenes in family life unless
parents have seriously defaulted on their
responsibility to care for their children. Of
course, sometimes the government preempts
parental authority, for example, through
regulations mandating the use of car seats
or requiring certain vaccinations, but even
these preventive measures can be controversial, at least initially. Moreover, they do not
target particular families and are justified on
public health grounds.
By contrast, when parents default on their
responsibilities, the state intervenes directly,
and often intrusively, providing an array of
services to the family and child. As Berger
and Font write, the child welfare system
profoundly affects the lives of many families, particularly low-income and minority
families. The child welfare system uses two
approaches to pursue its goals of protecting
children believed to be abused or neglected
by their families and strengthening families where children are at imminent risk for
abuse and neglect.31 First, if child welfare
officials believe a child can remain safely at
home with additional support, the family
receives preventive services, such as family
or individual counseling, substance-abuse
treatment, domestic-violence intervention,
or parenting classes. These services aim to
1 84
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strengthen the family and keep the child
out of foster care. But when officials determine that the child cannot remain safely in
the home or that preventive services have
not been effective, they follow the second
approach: the child is placed in foster care
with a relative, an unrelated family, or an
institution. The state typically has a duty
to reunite the children with their families,
but when this is not possible, it can move to
terminate parental rights and place the child
with an adoptive family.
Both of these approaches to child wellbeing follow a crisis-intervention model. The
preventive services—counseling, substance
abuse treatment, etc.—are provided only
after the family has come to the attention of
the authorities and the child is deemed to be
at risk. Too often at this point, an adversarial
relationship develops between the state and
the family. Parents who face the threat of
losing their children are understandably
suspicious of state involvement. And the state
is wary of the parents, because by the time
intervention occurs, the functioning of at
least one of the parents is likely at a nadir. As
Berger and Font show, preventive services
offered at this stage are largely ineffective.
Most cases in the child welfare system
involve parental neglect rather than abuse,
among families struggling with substance
abuse, inadequate housing, or inappropriate
child-care arrangements.32 These problems
may indeed threaten a child’s wellbeing, but
the child welfare system, with its late-stage
intervention and extreme sanction of removing children and placing them in foster care,
often fails to adequately address the underlying issues, which are grounded in poverty.
Although the crisis-intervention approach
stems partly from the law’s respect for family
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autonomy, in practice it offers little protection for parents who become involved in the
child welfare system. This fact raises serious
questions about socioeconomic discrimination. Children in the system overwhelmingly come from low-income families.33 The
fact that parental rights are constitutionally
protected ensures that the state must meet
a high standard of harm before it removes a
child, but parental rights do not give parents
a right to any state assistance before they
face the risk of losing a child.
Even outside the child welfare system, when
the government offers to help low-income
parents improve their children’s health,
the assistance often comes at a cost to
personal autonomy and privacy. New York,
for example, offers the Medicaid-funded
Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP),
which seeks to decrease infant mortality and
increase birth weight among babies born
to low-income mothers. But to participate
in PCAP, low-income women must divulge
extensive personal information that women
with private insurance would not be required
to tell their doctors. Women are asked questions about their immigration status, sources
of income (including questions about criminal activity and working off the books), prior
involvement with the child welfare system,
and many questions about their eating habits
and psychosocial history. Although the PCAP
is well-intentioned, the state’s stance toward
the participants appears to be distrustful
rather than collaborative.34
In sum, the libertarian legal framework, with
its emphasis on parental rights and responsibilities, deeply influences programs and
policies affecting children’s health. Because
the government has no obligation to promote
children’s welfare, every program is optional
and vulnerable to the vagaries of politics.

Under the federalist system, states are free
to adopt widely varying levels of support for
children’s health and wellbeing. And libertarian values discourage a preventive approach
to family welfare, despite evidence that
preventive programs can enhance children’s
health. Instead, the state often offers support
only after a family hits a crisis. To be sure,
there is much to like about a regime that
values parental autonomy and encourages
pluralism. But the libertarian legal framework together with our federalist system
can hinder efforts to provide comprehensive
health services for children and families.

Adolescent Health and
Parental Authority
Adolescents are more capable than are
young children of making health-care decisions, and once they reach the age of majority at 18, they become legal adults with the
authority and presumed competence to do
so. Until then, as we have seen, parental
consent is required, and parents continue to
bear responsibility for their children’s health
care. But there are exceptions to this general rule, and in some treatment contexts,
consent by adolescents to medical treatment
is legally valid with limited or no parental involvement. Further, an adolescent’s
refusal of treatment is occasionally given
some weight; for example, parents’ authority
to admit their children to inpatient psychiatric facilities is subject to restrictions. In
this section, we discuss four areas in which
the law treats adolescents differently from
younger children: the mature minor doctrine; public health laws sometimes called
minors’ consent statutes; minor’s refusal of
treatment; and the right of access to reproductive health services, including abortion
and contraception. In each setting, for different reasons, parental involvement in their
VOL. 25 / NO. 1 / S PR ING 2015
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children’s health-care decisions is deemed
unnecessary or is restricted. Sometimes,
mature minors’ consent is deemed legally
adequate to shield physicians from liability.
Occasionally, parental authority is limited
because the parent and child may have a
conflict of interest (as when parents seek
to admit children to psychiatric facilities); in other situations, a parental consent
requirement might deter adolescents from
seeking needed services, and public health
concerns favor letting them get treatment
without involving parents (minors’ consent
laws). Finally, abortion decisions represent a
unique category of health-care decisions that
involve key constitutional values.

The Mature Minor Doctrine
Under the long-recognized mature minor
rule, parental consent to medical treatment
is sometimes deemed unnecessary for adolescents mature enough to make their own
decisions.35 Courts developed the mature
minor doctrine to protect physicians from
legal liability when they treat minors under
circumstances in which obtaining parental
consent is either impossible or difficult and
waiting to provide treatment would be risky.
A physician who fails to obtain informed
consent before providing treatment can incur
legal liability for committing a battery on the
patient. Because minors are presumed to be
incompetent to make informed treatment
decisions, treating physicians could incur tort
liability for providing treatment without valid
parental consent. Mature minor doctrine
recognizes that the presumption of incompetence as applied to older minors is based
more on administrative convenience than on
scientific reality.
When is the mature minor doctrine applied?
Courts have focused on the following factors
in concluding that parental consent is not
1 86
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necessary: 1) The treatment must be undertaken for the benefit of the minor; 2) the
minor must be mature enough to understand the procedure and its consequences;
and 3) the procedure cannot be of a serious
nature (except for emergency treatment).36
In the case of a serious procedure, parents
should be consulted or a guardian appointed.
The mature minor doctrine indirectly
acknowledges that adolescents are competent
to make medical decisions, but it should not
be understood to confer “rights” on teenagers on this basis. The doctrine’s purpose is
to protect physicians from liability if parents
later bring suit against them on the grounds
that informed consent was not obtained
before the teen was treated. The mature
minor doctrine is also not a general rule
authorizing adolescents’ consent, although
a recent study found that physicians believe
this is the case.37 Instead, the adolescent’s
consent constitutes a valid substitute for the
absent parent only under limited conditions.

Minor Consent Statutes
Many states have enacted minor consent
statutes that allow minors to obtain particular health-care services without parental
consent or involvement.38 These services
typically include outpatient treatment for
substance abuse; outpatient mental health
therapy; treatment for sexually transmitted
diseases; and contraceptive, pregnancy, and
family planning services. Although such statutes do not explicitly target adolescents, the
nature of the designated treatments is such
that application to younger children would
be unusual. Thus, presumably, most patients
who obtain treatment under such statutes are
likely competent to consent to treatment.
The primary purpose of these statutes is not
to protect physicians from liability (although
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they in fact do so) or to expand adolescents’
rights. Instead, minor consent statutes have
an important public health purpose—they
encourage teenagers to get treatment
that they might be deterred from seeking
if parental consent or involvement were
required. These sensitive treatments involve
private concerns and behaviors that adolescents may be loath to share with parents. At
one level, the statutes recognize and respect
individual privacy, but their purpose is also
pragmatic. Society has an important interest
in contraceptive use by teenagers who are
sexually active and in appropriate treatment
for those who have STDs or substance abuse
problems—both for their own welfare and
that of society. Legislatures enacting these
statutes believe that removing obstacles to
treatment in these cases serves both public
health and teen welfare goals. Further, even
if most parents likely would help their teenager obtain these sensitive treatments, the
intuition is that some might not, and the laws
allow children to receive treatments without
confronting their parents’ objections.

Adolescents’ Refusal of Treatment
Parents’ general authority is sometimes
restricted either because the parent seeking treatment may have a conflict of interest
with the child or because the adolescent
child objects to the treatment. Both of these
elements may be present when parents seek
admission to inpatient psychiatric facilities
for their children. Psychiatric hospitalization
generally is assumed to differ from conventional medical treatment because it often
involves restrictions on personal liberty to
protect mentally ill patients from harming
themselves or others. For these reasons, in
the 1970s and 1980s, state lawmakers, partly
responding to constitutional concerns raised
by the Supreme Court, greatly reduced
long-term institutionalization of mentally ill

people and restricted involuntary commitment.39 These policies indirectly affected
parents’ authority to admit their children to
psychiatric hospitals.
A conflict of interest may arise when a parent’s decision to place a child in an inpatient
facility is prompted by the child’s disruptive
and perhaps offensive behavior rather than a
serious mental illness. In response, lawmakers have created special regulations that apply
to parents’ decisions to admit their children
to psychiatric hospitals. Most importantly, in
1979, the Supreme Court held that because
minors have a liberty interest in not being
confined unnecessarily and not being subject
to the stigma of inappropriate placement, special procedures are required to admit minors
to inpatient psychiatric treatment.40 The court
decreed that a neutral fact finder (who could
be a psychiatrist not involved with the minor’s
treatment) must confirm that institutional
placement is medically indicated; the court
also required an independent review after
an initial period of treatment to determine
whether continued commitment is necessary.
Some states have required more rigorous
procedures when an adolescent objects to psychiatric hospitalization, such as appointing an
attorney to represent the minor in a judicial
hearing. Further, in some states, the standard
for involuntary commitment is adapted from
the standard applied to adults—the minor
must present a serious danger to himself or
others or be unable to care for himself in an
age-appropriate manner.41

Sex Education and
Reproductive Services
Minors’ access to sex education and reproductive health services—and particularly
to abortion—has generated far more political controversy than other issues affecting
children’s health care. On the one hand,
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some religious and political advocates argue
that sexual activity should be reserved for
marriage and generally view teenage sexual
activity as immoral; many oppose minors’
access to abortion as well. Those who hold
these views also often believe that parents’
authority in this realm is critically important.
In their eyes, sex education is the parents’
role, and teenagers need parental guidance
when they make decisions about sexual
behavior. Thus they oppose sex education in
public schools and object to the notion that
teens have a right of privacy. On the other
hand, pragmatic public health advocates and
others assume that teenage sexual activity is inevitable and see reducing teenage
pregnancy as a major policy goal. From this
perspective, the most effective way to reduce
teenage pregnancy and limit the need for
abortion is to provide comprehensive sex
education and make contraceptive services
readily available to teenagers. In this view,
abortion should be available to pregnant
minors to avoid teenage childbearing and
rearing, but avoiding teen pregnancy altogether is the primary policy goal.
Since public schools began to offer sex education classes in the 1970s, some religious
parents have objected on the ground that the
instruction conflicts with the religious and
moral values that they want their children to
learn, and that the state is interfering with
a parental prerogative. In response, many
school districts have voluntarily established
policies allowing parents to exempt their
children from classes and programs that
deal directly or indirectly with sexuality.
When school districts have declined to do so,
courts have been divided on the question of
whether parents have a constitutional right
to exempt their children from exposure to
material that they find offensive on grounds
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of their religious faith. Increasingly, courts
have rejected parents’ claims, pointing to
public schools’ broad discretion to control
curriculum, as well as to the state’s substantial public health interest in combating
AIDS, other STDs, and teenage pregnancy.42
As public schools have become the forum for
instruction on important public health issues,
parental rights have been accorded less
weight in that context.

As public schools have become
the forum for instruction
on important public health
issues, parental rights have
been accorded less weight in
that context.
The battle over contraception has also largely
been won by public health advocates. Teen
pregnancy has declined in recent years, but
its costs to the young parents, their children,
and society are substantial. Teenage parents’
educational attainment and socioeconomic
status are lower than that of people who
postpone childbearing into their twenties,
and their children have lower educational
achievement and poorer health than do children born to older parents.43 Many states now
have statutes (sometimes as part of broader
minor consent statutes, described above)
allowing minors to obtain contraceptive services without parental consent. Making contraceptives available through public school
nurses’ offices has been more controversial,
though some urban public school systems
allow high school students to get contraceptives this way, often with the provision that
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parents can exclude their children by signing
a form.44 Many experts believe that policies making it easy for teenagers to obtain
contraceptives, together with neutral educational programs that tell them how to avoid
pregnancy, have played a major role in the
dramatic reduction in teenage pregnancy and
childbearing over the past decade.45
Independent access to abortion by pregnant
minors continues to be far more contentious.
Currently, minors who are willing to involve
their parents can obtain abortions subject
only to the restrictions that have been found
legally acceptable for adult women. The
disputes arise when states restrict minors’
ability to get an abortion without parental
consent or involvement. In general, although
the political and legal debate is often framed
in terms of parental rights or teen welfare,
the issue of minors’ access to abortion also
represents another setting in which the right
to abortion itself is disputed; advocates for
restricting access for minors often oppose
abortion altogether.
Abortion decisions are distinctive in many
ways. The issue is constitutionally important,
of course; partly for this reason, many see
the decision to get an abortion as fundamentally different from routine medical decisions that require parental consent. Parents
may have a conflict of interest with their
pregnant daughter, because of their views
either about abortion or about her sexual
activity and pregnancy; minors may fear their
parents’ anger or objection to the abortion.46
Moreover, abortion (like other reproductive
decisions) involves a private and sensitive
matter that adolescents may be reluctant to
discuss with their parents. Finally, the teenager considering an abortion will become a
parent if the pregnancy is not terminated,

making her status as a minor subject to her
parents’ authority somewhat discordant.
Since it decided Roe v. Wade in 1972, the
Supreme Court, in several opinions, has
examined the constitutionality of state
statutes that restrict minors’ access to abortion by requiring either parental consent or
parental notification.47 In these decisions, the
court has sought to balance the reproductive
rights of pregnant teenagers against the parents’ right to be involved in important decisions affecting their children’s welfare, while
also recognizing the independent interest of
the state in the welfare of minors.
In Bellotti v. Baird, a landmark 1979 decision, the court provided a framework for
regulating minors’ access to abortion in
states seeking to design a constitutionally
acceptable process that accommodates some
level of parental involvement.48 In Bellotti,
the court reiterated that pregnant minors
have constitutionally protected reproductive rights, but it held that the state may
limit minors’ rights to a greater extent than
would be acceptable for adult women.49 The
court justified such limits on three grounds:
minors’ greater vulnerability and need for
protection; their lack of the “experience,
perspective and judgment” needed to make
sound decisions; and parents’ constitutionally
protected authority to guide their children’s
upbringing. Bellotti held that a state may
require parental consent to abortion, but it
must also provide an alternative procedure
in which a minor can demonstrate that she is
mature enough to make the decision without her parents’ consent. If a minor is found
to lack the requisite maturity, the judge
(or other designated official) should decide
whether abortion without parental consent is
in her best interest. Thus, under the court’s
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guidelines, parental consent to abortion
should be required only when it is in the
minor’s interest.
The Supreme Court has also upheld statutes
that require parental notification (but not
consent) before a minor can get an abortion.50
In theory, these statutes infringe less on the
pregnant minor’s rights, because parents,
once notified, lack the authority to block the
abortion by withholding consent. But the
prospect of notifying their parents constitutes a major deterrent for many teenagers,
who fear their parents’ response.51 Although
the court did not explicitly exclude mature
minors from the notification requirement,
most states have established a procedure by
which mature minors can avoid notification.
Some states do not distinguish between
pregnant minors and adults, allowing minors
to consent to abortion without parental
consent or notification. But a majority of
states have responded to the Supreme Court
decisions by enacting statutes that establish
judicial bypass hearings, in which a judge
can evaluate the maturity and (sometimes)
best interest of the minor seeking abortion
without involving the parents.52 The Supreme
Court did not provide any criteria to guide
judges in evaluating whether a minor is
“mature enough and well enough informed
to make the abortion decision independently
of her parents’ wishes,” or whether abortion
without parental consent would be in her
best interest.53 Thus courts have broad discretion to interpret these terms and to apply
the constitutionally mandated requirements.
Implementation of statutes requiring judicial
bypass proceedings and the obstacles facing
minors who seek abortions vary considerably
across and even within states. In some states,
each minor is provided an attorney to assist
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her in the hearing (often through the pro
bono services of bar associations); in other
states, teenagers receive little assistance.54
Further, courts take different approaches
to evaluating the maturity of petitioning
minors. Some courts focus narrowly on the
minor’s basic understanding of the medical
procedure and its consequences, while others
undertake a broad evaluation of the minor’s
maturity. Courts that use the latter approach
are more likely to find the minor “immature,” pointing to such factors as her financial
dependence on her parents, nervousness in
the hearing, and even carelessness in engaging in unprotected sex.55 The outcomes of
these proceedings also vary in different
areas, although most petitions are granted.
In Massachusetts, a study found that judges
virtually always approve the minor’s petition, either finding her sufficiently mature
to make the decision or concluding that the
abortion is in her best interest.56 Courts
in other states, applying rigorous maturity
criteria, reject some petitions; more importantly, they likely deter some pregnant teens
from petitioning in a timely manner, or at all.
Further, in some areas, bypass proceedings
and abortion facilities may not be available
near a minor’s home—a greater impediment
to access for minors than for adults.
Many legal scholars have criticized judicial
bypass proceedings for creating burdensome
obstacles for pregnant teenagers, many of
whom are already experiencing extraordinary
stress.57 The procedure itself creates delay,
sometimes increasing the risk of the abortion. Moreover, although bypass hearings
are supposed to be confidential, petitioning
teens must reveal in court the very intimate
facts of their sexual activity and condition,
as well other highly personal information. As
legal scholar Carol Sanger has put it, bypass
hearings, despite their purportedly benign
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purposes, can serve as a form of punishment
for pregnant teens.58

Treatment in the Juvenile
Justice System
When juveniles commit a crime and are
adjudicated delinquent, they are subject to
the authority of the juvenile justice system. As part of their disposition, they may
be required to participate in rehabilitative
treatment. This treatment aims to reduce the
risk of reoffending and to promote healthy
psychological development, increasing the
likelihood that delinquent youths will mature
into productive adults. Moreover, adolescents
in the justice system are more likely to suffer from untreated mental health problems
than are youths not involved in the system, including depression, attention deficit
disorders and substance abuse problems.
Diagnosing and treating these problems is
often essential to rehabilitation. The parents
of delinquent youths may also be required
to participate in treatment programs on the
well-substantiated theory that parents and
family may directly or indirectly contribute
to adolescents’ criminal activity and are often
critically important to rehabilitation.59
In the early twenty-first century, juvenile
justice policy has undergone a major shift
toward a more rehabilitative approach, supported by a growing consensus that juvenile offenders, due to their developmental
immaturity, differ in important ways from
their adult counterparts, and that, for most
young offenders, treatment is more effective
than harsh punishment in furthering the
law’s goal of reducing reoffending. This trend
represents a departure from the punitive
policies of the 1990s, when elevated rates of
juvenile crime led many states to enact laws
making it easier to prosecute and punish
juveniles as adults. In the juvenile system

also, incarceration became the norm.60 In
part, the momentum behind the recent rehabilitative trend comes from a growing body
of evidence that incarcerated youths have
high recidivism rates and that some community-based programs not only cost less than
incarceration but are quite effective at reducing reoffending.61 Moreover, research in
developmental neuroscience and psychology
has reinvigorated the traditional assumptions
about youthful immaturity and the potential
of young offenders to reform that animated
juvenile courts for much of the twentieth
century but fell out of favor in the 1990s.
Many states have embraced this research,
as well as an evidence-based approach
to juvenile crime regulation, and have
diverted resources from state institutions
to community-based correctional programs
that are t ailored to the needs of adolescent offenders. In New York, for example, a
governor’s task force in 2009 issued a scathing report describing abusive conditions
and lack of treatment in juvenile institutions, most of which were far from offenders’ homes.62 In response to the report and
other investigations, New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg announced that city
youths would no longer be sent to these
facilities. Many have been closed, with youths
being sent to smaller therapeutic programs
in their communities.63 In 2013, a National
Academy of Sciences committee issued a
National Research Council report advocating a developmentally informed, researchbased approach to juvenile justice policy.64
The report cites a large body of research in
strongly recommending that most youths be
treated in rehabilitative programs in the community, that those who require residential
treatment be placed in small facilities near
their homes, and that parents play a key role
in treatment.
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The most effective correctional treatment
programs seek to encourage healthy psychosocial development by giving juvenile offenders
developmental tools and support in their social
context. A critical dimension of treatment in
most programs, as the NRC report suggests,
is parents’ participation, even for youths in
residential facilities. Experts on adolescent
development emphasize that authoritative
parent figures are important to psychosocial maturation, and parents are frequently
directed by juvenile court judges to participate
in treatment programs. Thus parents whose
children are in the justice system do not
enjoy the deference to parental authority that
other parents enjoy. Parental involvement is
a core component of tested programs such as
Functional Family Therapy, Multi-dimensional
Treatment Foster Care, and Multisystemic
Therapy (MST).65
MST is thoroughly grounded in developmental
knowledge and is one of the most effective
treatment programs for adolescent offenders; it
has been carefully evaluated for more than 20
years with a broad range of offenders.66 MST
combines cognitive behavioral therapy with an
ecological approach that deals with individual
youths in the multiple social contexts that they
inhabit—their families, peer groups, schools,
and communities. It focuses on giving parents
the skills and resources they need to avoid
problem behaviors, and it helps delinquent
youths cope with family, peer, and school problems that contribute to their criminal activity.
The success of MST and other programs in
reducing recidivism has been instrumental in
creating support for a community-based rehabilitative approach to juvenile justice policy.
Diagnosing and treating mental health
problems of youth in the justice system has
taken on greater urgency in recent years,
with growing evidence that many delinquent
1 92

T H E F UT UR E OF C HI LDRE N

youths suffer from mental health conditions that likely contribute to their criminal
activity. For example, a major study that
followed teen offenders over time has found
a high correlation between youthful reoffending and substance abuse, suggesting
that effective treatment of offenders’ drug
and alcohol problems may reduce recidivism
rates. Many offenders in the study received
substance abuse treatment in juvenile facilities, but treatment was less common in the
community. The researchers found that
substance abuse treatment in the justice
system reduced both substance abuse and
recidivism, but only when the treatment
lasted for a substantial period and involved
the parents.67
In recent years, the juvenile justice system has responded more effectively to the
mental health problems (including substance
abuse) of youths in the system with a simple,
accurate, and inexpensive screening test. The
Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument,
developed by psychologist Thomas Grisso
and psychiatrist Richard Barnum, is now
widely used in juvenile detention centers and
has been credited with reducing suicides and
increasing diagnosis and treatment of juvenile offenders’ mental health problems.68
The recent focus on treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders is both paternalistic and pragmatic. A growing body of
research in developmental psychology and
brain science has persuaded many people
that harsh adult punishment for adolescents
is usually inappropriate, and likely more
harmful to youths than to adult criminals.69
But support for a rehabilitative approach to
youthful offending also comes from evidence
that it is more effective in reducing recidivism than the punitive sentencing policies
of the 1990s. Thus, as in other areas of legal
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regulation, social welfare, and not simply the
welfare of minors, guides policy in response
to issues of children’s health.
A rehabilitative approach to juvenile crime
is both less costly and likely more effective
than incarceration-based policies. But like
intervention in child maltreatment cases,
juvenile justice dispositions represent a form
of crisis intervention—the approach adopted
by our libertarian legal system. As we have
indicated, early childhood prevention programs that offer support to families and
children have been shown to reduce adolescent offending and to produce other positive outcomes. Greater use of programs and
policies that provide health care and other
services—especially mental health services—
to younger children and their families might
reduce problem behavior in adolescence, and
at a lower social cost than society incurs in
responding to juvenile crime.

Conclusions
The libertarian legal framework that
regulates children’s health care in the
United States—protecting parental rights
while taking a hands-off approach to child
wellbeing—has important consequences for
policy. Unlike other developed countries,
the United States has not undertaken an
affirmative legal obligation to ensure children’s health and wellbeing. This lack of a
legal mandate to invest in family functioning and child health puts the onus on policy
makers, researchers, and advocates to build
public and political support for policies
promoting child and family welfare. To do
so, and to overcome philosophical opposition, requires persuasive arguments that
investments in children’s health will not
only benefit children but will also promote
social welfare.
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